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INTRODUCTION 
The St. Regis Mohawk Indian Reservation (SRMIR) is among 
the largest Haudenosaunee Tribal Reservations and represents the 
U.S. side of a trans-border Mohawk community that exists on both 
banks of the St. Lawrence River.1 The SRMIR, with a population of 
3,228 according to the 2010 U.S. Census,2 exists in close proximity 
to the Town of Bombay (which has only about a third of the 
population).3 Although State of New York (“New York,” or “the 
State”) has concurrent jurisdiction with all Indian Nations within its 
borders,4 the St. Regis Tribal Government has greatly expanded its 
judicial services over the last decade—a trend which continues to 
the present.5 Nevertheless, the relatively small size of the SRMIR 
means that residents can find themselves charged with offenses 
before the Town of Bombay Court, which, depending on the 
seriousness of the charge, may result in their arrest and detention. 
                                                                                                         
1 The adjacent Canadian First Nation territory is the Akwesasne Reserve. 
2 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, American Fact Finder, CENSUS, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (typing in St. Regis 
Mohawk Reservation, Franklin County, New York into the Community Facts 
search bar provides this information) (last visited May 11, 2016). 
3 Id. (changing Community Facts search to Bombay town, Franklin County, 
New York). 
4 25 U.S.C.A. § 232 (West 2004) (providing that New York has jurisdiction over 
offenses committed on Indian Reservations “to the same extent as . . . over 
offenses committed elsewhere in the State as defined by the laws of the State”). 
5 See generally SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, Tribal Police, SRMT-NSN, 
http://www.srmt-nsn.gov/divisions/tribal_police/ (last visited May 11, 2016); 
SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, Tribal Court, SRMT-NSN, http://www.srmt-
nsn.gov/government/tribal_court/ (last visited May 22, 2016). 
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The concerns of the treatment of Indians by non-Indian police and 
before non-Indian courts are by no means new ones and continue to 
be important issues.6 However, the plight of SRMIR residents points 
to another area of concern which has received relatively little 
attention: the ability of Indian defendants to make bail.  
On almost all Indian Reservations the alienation of tribal land is 
restricted either by the Federal Government7—which acts as 
trustee—or, by the tribe itself.8 While such restrictions have an 
understandable purpose, given the history of dispossession and 
displacement of Indian tribes, it creates an unusual problem for 
Indian defendants: the collateral typically used for bail bonds is real 
estate and their fee interest in their lands is inadequate for this 
purpose.9 
This Article aims to briefly sketch the contours of this problem 
using the situation of St. Regis Reservation residents as an 
exemplary case before proposing and evaluating some concrete 
responses to the issue. Part I discusses the mechanics and 
requirements of New York's bail laws and their application by New 
York courts. Here the conundrum facing SRMIR residents will also 
be portrayed and some of the negative effects discussed. Part II 
briefly examines some of the constitutional questions regarding the 
application of New York's bail laws to Indian Reservation residents 
                                                                                                         
6 See generally Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing 
Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 740–48 (2008); Gregory D. 
Smith, Disparate Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Indians in 
Indian Country: Why Congress should run the Erie Railroad into the Major 
Crimes Act, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 484, 484–88 (2004). A relatively recent 
scandal in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan shows that maltreatment of Indians by 
police is very much a North American phenomenon. See TWO WORLDS 
COLLIDING (National Film Board of Canada 2004) (documentary concerning the 
“starlight tours” deaths, where Saskatoon Police allegedly arrested Indians and 
then abandoned them outside the city without proper clothing to die). 
7 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.A §§ 391, 396c, 465 (West 2014); see generally Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
8 See, e.g., ST. REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, St. Regis Mohawk Tribe Land Dispute 
Resolution Ordinance, SRMT-NSN (2009), http://www.srmt-
nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/LandDisputeResolutionOrdinance_120309.pdf (the 
Tribe's “Land Dispute Resolution Ordinance,” Section V provides that “[t]he 
power to make land assignments and to issue Use and Occupancy Deeds is 
vested in the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Council” and that “Reservation land may 
not be sold to, held by or in any way relinquished to a non-Member of the St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe”) (last visited May 11, 2016). 
9 Id. 
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and suggests some approaches to a constitutional challenge, 
including an assessment of its prospects for success. Part III then 
turns to the subject of possible reforms, considering successful 
examples from inside New York and from other jurisdictions, 
including Pre-Trial Risk Assessment procedures, Charitable Bail 
Bond Organizations, and various “Alternative to Detention” 
Programs. Part IV then evaluates the practicability and effectiveness 
of these reform projects in light of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe's 
needs and circumstances. The author hopes that this analysis, 
although factually limited to the case of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 
will provide insight into possible approaches to resolving a problem 
that faces the members of other Indian tribes as well. 
 
I. THE INDIAN DEFENDANT'S DILEMMA: BAIL BONDS AS A NON-
OPTION 
 
A. New York Bail Law & Methods of Posting Bail 
Bail in New York, in the purest technical sense, is meant only to 
ensure that the defendant appears at the next scheduled court 
appearance, and New York law does not provide for consideration 
of any risks to the community.10 Otherwise, the defendant should be 
released on his own recognizance, particularly for “non-felony” 
offenses.11 New York is, in fact, one of only two states that does not 
provide for a public safety consideration when making bail 
determinations, although a recent study suggests that judges do in 
fact take public safety into consideration in their decisions.12 Thus, 
residents of other states considering the case study in this Article 
should keep in mind that their jurisdiction may require consideration 
                                                                                                         
10 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(2)(a) (2012) (“the court must consider the kind 
and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure [defendant's] court 
attendance when required”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 520.10 (2006). 
11 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial 
Detention of Low Income Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HRW, 10 
(Dec. 2, 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf (citing 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 530.20). 
12 Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
497, 548–49 (2012). The study noted, however, that while New York judges 
appeared to be taking public safety into consideration, this factor was far less 
important than flight risk and carried far less weight than in other jurisdictions. 
Id. 
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of this additional factor, which is not provided for under New York 
law. 
The forms of permissible bail in New York are actually very 
liberal, providing a range of options: cash bail, insurance company 
bail bond, secured surety bond, secured appearance bond, partially 
secured surety bond, partially secured appearance bond, unsecured 
surety bond, unsecured appearance bond, and even posting bail by 
credit card.13 If the court chooses to fix bail in any manner other than 
unsecured bonds it must provide for at least two forms of posting.14 
The permissive forms of some of these options should be noted. For 
instance, the unsecured appearance bond is a written promise 
executed by the defendant whereby the defendant will agree to pay 
bail (an agreed amount) if they fail to make a scheduled court 
appearance. A variation on this form of bail is to permit the 
defendant to post a fraction of the agreed to bail amount, and should 
the defendant fail to make a scheduled court appearance, the 
remaining portion will become due (a partially secured appearance 
bond). Another simple variation is to permit a third person to employ 
these mechanisms on behalf of the defendant, even without any 
deposit or lien upon property (an unsecured surety bond).15  
It should be noted that when these statutory mechanisms were 
approved in 1972 the New York State Legislature (“the 
Legislature”) specifically stated that it was responding to the fact 
that “many defendants are incarcerated prior to trial for lack of 
collateral, even though the court may have been inclined to and 
under the impression that release of such defendants following the 
fixing of relatively low bail.”16 In New York, though, there seems to 
be a reluctance by the courts to rely upon mechanisms “other than 
cash or secured bond.”17 
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to briefly sketch 
how insurance company bail bonds (“bail bonds”) are obtained. 
Defendants that lack sufficient funds to post cash bail will contract 
                                                                                                         
13 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 520.10 (2006) (noting that credit card use is only 
authorized on vehicle and traffic law matters). 
14 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 520.10(2)(b) (2006). 
15 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 12 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 
520.10 (2006)). 
16 Id. (citing N.Y. legislative record on bail mechanisms). 
17 Id.  
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with Bail Bond Agencies, which in exchange for a fee and with 
adequate collateral will secure the release of the defendant. Real 
property is the typical source of collateral for such a bond because 
it offers Bail Bond Agencies the security of immovable, identifiable 
property of relatively stable and ascertainable value. 
 
B. Indian Land Trusts & Restrictions on Alienation: The Non-
Viability of Bail Bonds 
The territory of Tribal Reservations is typically held in trust by 
the United States government for the benefit of those tribes,18 
although the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe is the entity imposing 
restrictions on land within its territory.19 While individual tribal 
members may be permitted to live on or use the land much the same 
as fee holders in other U.S. states, subject to federal and tribal 
regulation, they are not permitted to sell the land.20 Indeed, in the 
case of lands held in trust by the Federal government, even the tribe 
itself lacks this power.21  
The upshot of this is if a resident of an Indian reservation like 
SRMIR is arrested and brought before a court in the state of New 
York, their bail options are severely limited because they are unable 
to use their land as collateral for a bail bond. Judges typically favor 
providing defendants with two options, cash bail or secured bond, 
and typically set the secured bond at a far greater amount than cash 
bail.22 For an SRMIR resident, however, this effectively means that 
                                                                                                         
18 See 25 U.S.C.A § 391 (West 2016) (permitting the President to “continue such 
restrictions on alienation for such period as he may deem best”); 25 U.S.C.A § 
396 (West 2016) (requiring lessees of “restricted Indian lands . . . for mining 
purposes” to “furnish corporate surety bonds”); and 25 U.S.C.A § 465 (West 
2016); see also Jessica A. Shoemaker, Comment, Like Snow in the Spring: 
Allotment, Fractionation, and the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 WISC. L. 
REV. 729, 732–40 (2003) (discussing the problem of “fractionation” of land on 
Indian Reservations resulting from Federal Laws and policies and suggesting 
possible solutions); Padraic I. McCoy, The Land must hold the People: Native 
Modes of Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land 
into Trust through 25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 424–45 
(2002–2003) (offering an excellent overview of the development of Indian 
Reservations and the conflicting concepts of territorial sovereignty). 
19 See ST. REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, supra note 8. 
20 25 U.S.C.A § 391 (West 2016). 
21 Id. 
22 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 38–39 (examining the 
prevailing bail practices in New York City). 
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they are always compelled to come up with the cash bail if it is 
required.  
Recent data obtained by the SRMIR Tribal Court from the Town 
of Bombay Court sheds some light on the scale of this problem.23 
The figures used here represent data during the period from April 1–
July 31, 2014 and include all defendants arrested and brought before 
the Town of Bombay Court during that time.24 In this period, the 
Town of Bombay Court set bail for 250 defendants, often for 
amounts of $10,000 or more.25 Among the 160 persons held in jail 
and eventually released, 35 were Native Americans, 11 were black, 
and the remainder were white.26 While white defendants typically 
received an average cash bail amount of $6,896 and a bond amount 
of $13,778, the Native Americans released received on average 
$10,320 and $20,382, respectively.27 Regarding offenses charged, 
the Native Americans had a higher average number of 
misdemeanors (an average of 1.41 versus 0.877 for whites), while 
whites had a higher number of felonies (an average of 0.67 versus 
0.54 for Native Americans).28 While one might ascribe some of the 
deviations in bail and bond amounts (49 percent and 47 percent, 
respectively) to the higher number of misdemeanor charges amongst 
Native Americans, the higher felony rate among the white 
defendants raises some questions, as felonies are regarded as the 
more serious crimes.29 Even if the differences in bail and bond 
amounts are ultimately justified, the fact remains that SRMIR 
residents facing high cash bail have far less room to maneuver than 
their white counterparts, who may at least be able to obtain a bond 
if they are unable to pay the cash bail.  
 
 
                                                                                                         
23 The data in question was compiled by the SRMIR Tribal Court Clerk in the 
fall of 2014. See infra APPENDIX I, II. 
24 See infra APPENDIX I—Charges & Bail Amounts by Race. 
25 Id. 
26 See infra APPENDIX I (the figures for black and “other” defendants have not 
been included in the Appendix because they were not relevant for further 
statistical analysis, but remain on file with the author). 
27 Id. (it should be emphasized that these are average figures—bail and bond 
amounts are usually whole dollar amounts, e.g., $1000, $1500, etc.). 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE NEW YORK BAIL 
LAWS 
Reservation residents (who are usually also Indians) form a class 
of persons for whom bail bonds are often a foregone conclusion and 
are arguably owed a different set of alternatives. Indeed, the 
requirement that at least two forms of bail be set was specifically 
aimed to ensure that criminal defendants were not consigned to pre-
trial custody simply because the form of bail set was unattainable.30 
The plight of Indian defendants in such situations not only illustrates 
a contradiction within the law itself but arguably rises to the level of 
violating the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as a result 
of its disparate impact on a recognized racial group.31 
 
A. Nominal Intent of § 520.10 Versus Its Execution in Practice 
The Legislature's express purpose in providing alternative forms 
of bail was to enable judges to provide defendants with methods to 
secure their release during the pre-trial phase of proceedings, even 
if they were unable to make the cash amount or obtain a traditional 
bail bond.32 While the language of § 520.10 could conceivably 
support an interpretation by which a judge could specify a single 
form of bail, the New York Court of Appeals determined in People 
ex rel. McManus v. Horn that a judge's options were restricted: 1) 
setting a bail amount without any specified method or 2) specifying 
two or more methods as alternatives to the defendant.33 However, 
this decision does not affect § 520.10(2)(b), which permits judges 
designating alternative bail forms to specify different amounts for 
the different forms. Instead, this permits judges to provide for bail 
forms that are “alternative” in only the most technical of senses: if a 
judge specifies that cash bail is $20,000 and that a partially secured 
appearance bond is $200,000, he has essentially required the 
                                                                                                         
30 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 520.10(2)(b) (2006); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
11, at 12 (citing the N.Y. legislature's express statement of purpose in altering 
the statute). 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 
(1976). 
32 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 12 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 
520.10 (2006)). 
33 New York ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 967 N.E.2d 671, 673–74 (N.Y. 2012). 
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defendant to come up with $20,000 regardless of bail form because 
the “partial security” on the bond equals 10% of the total amount.34  
Furthermore, the bail forms that do not require defendants to 
sign over money up front, e.g., unsecured surety or unsecured 
appearance bonds, are rarely utilized by judges in New York.35 
 
B. Sketch of a Potential Constitutional Challenge to the New York 
Bail Laws 
The mere fact that a given defendant cannot pay the bail amount 
in question, whether in cash or through some form of secured bond, 
does not automatically render the bail unconstitutional for being 
“excessive.”36 However, for reservation residents, such bonds might 
be unattainable entirely independent of the amount of bail because 
the chief form of collateral, real property, is unavailable for that 
purpose.37 Given the discrete and disparate effect of New York's bail 
laws, and especially its judges' application of those laws to Indian 
defendants, there exists a real possibility that presenting Indians 
with such “non-alternatives” in obtaining bail constitutes precisely 
the kind of “invidious discrimination” that the U.S. Constitution's 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits.38  
As an initial matter, it is important to understand that NY CPL § 
520 does not explicitly target Indians or reservation residents and as 
such, “strict scrutiny” by courts on the basis of a “suspect 
classification” is not a given.39 However, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins the 
                                                                                                         
34 See Maureen Wynne, Note, Eighth Amendment Right to Reasonable Bail: 
McManus v. Horn:The Legality of Setting a Single Form of Bail: Court of 
Appeals of New York, People ex rel. McManus v. Horn (decided March 22, 
2012), 29 TOURO L. REV. 1537, 1552 (2013). 
35 Justine Olderman, Fixing New York's Broken Bail System, 16 CUNY L. REV. 
9, 18 (2012). 
36 See, e.g., Jennings v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 137, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“simply 
because a defendant cannot furnish the bail as set by the court” does not mean 
“it is excessive”); New York v. Burton, 569 N.Y.S.2d 861, 866 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1990) (the fact that homeowner's property was insufficient to cover bail did not 
render it an equal protection violation given “the absence of evidence of 
invidious distinctions between classes of citizens”). 
37 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.A §§ 391, 465 (West 2016). 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; compare Jennings v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 137, 
138 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1971) 
(discussing the standard for addressing possible equal protection violations). 
39 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (first 
mentioning of “suspect classification”). 
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Supreme Court held that even a facially neutral law may violate 
equal protection if it is unequally applied.40 The Court noted: 
 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial 
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered 
by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal 
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar 
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of 
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the 
Constitution.41 
 
The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis expanded 
on this concept, providing that plaintiffs could point to disparate 
impact on a protected class as a result of the operation or application 
of a given law to show discriminatory intent.42  
While there is ample evidence to show that the Legislature's 
motivation in crafting the current bail statutes was to permit and 
encourage judges to utilize forms of bail that did not require cash or 
high bond amounts, and thereby ensuring that more defendants 
obtained pre-trial release,43 judges in New York courts persist in 
setting bail in the form of cash or secured bonds (rarely making use 
of the alternative forms permitted them to by § 520).44 The disparate 
impact that this decision has on Indian defendants can be statistically 
shown45 and could form the basis of a challenge under the equal 
protection clause.46 Having made a prima facie case, the burden 
would then shift to the State to show that the procedures in place 
were not only racially neutral but that the result in question was a 
consequence of their proper application.47  
                                                                                                         
40 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374–75 (1886). 
41 Id. 
42 Davis, 426 U.S. at 240–41. 
43 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 13. 
44 Id. at 17. 
45 The information gleaned by the SRMIR Tribal Court from the Town of 
Bombay Court records, cited in this Article, represent an admittedly limited data 
sample, but indicate the general contours of the problem; discussions by the 
author with Tribal Court Judges familiar with the situation indicates that the 
inability of Indian defendants to obtain counsel is a chronic issue. See infra 
APPENDIX I. 
46 See generally Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356, 374–75; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240–41.  
47 Davis, 426 U.S. at 241. 
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This is not to say that such a constitutional challenge to the law 
is destined for success. The State would have no difficulty showing 
facial neutrality, as there is no “suspect classification” at work.48 The 
State could also make a strong case for neutral application, 
analogizing the plight of Indian Reservation residents to that of 
defendants who lack sufficient property, real or otherwise, to use as 
collateral for a bail bond. According to this line of reasoning, there 
is no difference between Indian defendants unable to obtain bail 
bonds because of fee restrictions on their land and defendants unable 
to afford cash bail who have no property to put up for collateral.49 
Moreover, “discriminatory intent” remains the watchword of the 
disparate impact analysis developed in Washington v. Davis—the 
entire purpose of examining the effects of a facially neutral law is to 
ascertain any unstated or concealed discriminatory intent. In the 
Court's words:  
 
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not 
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial 
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. 
Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that 
racial classifications are to be subjected to the 
strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the 
weightiest of considerations.50 
 
The Court later noted that “[l]egislatures are presumed to have 
acted constitutionally . . . and their statutory classifications will be 
set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.”51 
Here, the Legislature’s stated intent was not only racially neutral but 
in fact made no classifications at all—§ 520 applies to all criminal 
defendants without exception. Unless the disparity in the number of 
Indian defendants who fail to obtain release versus defendants from 
other racial groups is so dramatic as to permit no other conclusion, 
it appears unlikely that § 520 would be deemed unconstitutional in 
its application to Indian defendants.52 
 
                                                                                                         
48 Id.; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
49 See, e.g., Jennings v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 137, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
50 Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
51 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1971). 
52 Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
2016] Reservation Residents' Bail Catch-22 167 
 
 
III. SAME PROBLEMS, SAME SOLUTIONS?: APPROACHES TO BAIL 
REFORM 
The problems faced by SRMIR residents are unique in that most 
home- or land-owners outside of Indian Country are not restricted 
in using their property to acquire such bail bonds. Nevertheless, the 
prolonged incarceration of persons because of their inability to make 
bail is neither new nor limited in geographic scope: across the 
country and over the course of several decades jurists, law 
enforcement, legislators, and community groups have repeatedly 
raised the issue and sought solutions.53 This section examines in 
greater detail the efforts in a selection of communities that not only 
experienced success but could also be adapted to the SRMIR's 
particular circumstances. 
For convenience and ease of reading, these examples have been 
grouped according to the methods that they employ. While 
variations among the individual programs grouped under a 
particular heading will be discussed, the focus will rest on their 
commonalities and the extent to which these common features 
succeeded in different settings. 
 
A. Empirical Data & Individual Evaluation: Pre-Trial Risk 
Assessment in New Orleans Parish & Duluth, Minnesota 
The use of Pre-Trial Risk-Assessment Instruments (RAIs) has 
spread in recent years as a method of applying empirically obtained 
                                                                                                         
53 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11; Alex Petrossian, Note, Finally 
Some Improvement, but will it Accomplish Anything? An Analysis of Whether the 
Charitable Bail Bonds Bill can Survive the Ethical Challenges Headed its way, 
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2013, 2025 (2013); Gustavo Rivera, Bail Bond Charity, 
N.Y. SENATE (2012), http://www.nysenate.gov/news/bail-bond-charity 
(referencing Kristen Sanchez, Bail Bond Charity, BRONX TIMES (Aug. 21, 
2012), http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2012/33/33_bail_2012_08_16_bx.html 
(last visited May 11, 2016)) (last visited May 11, 2016); NORTH CAROLINA 
GOVERNOR'S CRIME COMMISSION, Pretrial Service Programs in North Carolina: 
A Prospect and Impact Assessment (Oct. 2007), 
https://www.nccrimecontrol.org/div/gcc/pdfs/pubs/psp.pdf; Cynthia Jones, Give 
us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 919, 945 (2013); RACIAL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT, 
Minnesota Task Force Members, RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT, 
http://racialjusticeproject.weebly.com/staff7.html (last visited May 11, 2016); 
Courtney Ham, New Orleans Pretrial Services Program has Promising Future, 
VERA (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.vera.org/blog/new-orleans-pretrial-services-
program-has-promising-future. 
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information to defendant behavior. The data is used to determine the 
precise risk that a given person poses for failure to appear or 
recidivism so that judges and court staff can make informed, 
objective decisions when setting bail conditions.54 This section 
focuses on two instances where RAIs and the attendant procedures 
were implemented: the introduction of a system of pre-trial risk 
assessment in New Orleans Parish with the support of the Vera 
Institute and the introduction of RAIs in the courts of St. Louis 
County, Minnesota with the aid of the ABA's Racial Justice 
Improvement Project (RJIP).55  
 
1. New Orleans Pre-Trial Services 
New Orleans Parish has long experienced jail occupancy that is 
well above the national average.56 This staggering difference did not 
decline in the post-Katrina period but was in fact exacerbated by the 
damage to facilities, the drain of personnel, and the general 
disruption that attended the storm and its aftermath.57 The city 
enlisted the aid of the Vera Institute to address the myriad of issues 
facing the New Orleans criminal justice system, which focused its 
efforts on reforming the process of determining bail so that the ends 
of public safety and ensuring appearance were met without 
                                                                                                         
54 See NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNOR'S CRIME COMMISSION, Pretrial Service 
Programs in North Carolina: A Prospect and Impact Assessment (Oct. 2007); 
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, New Orleans Pretrial Services, VERA, 
http://www.vera.org/project/new-orleans-pretrial-services (last visited May 11, 
2016); NEW ORLEANS PRETRIAL SERVICES, Why Pretrial Services, PRETRIAL 
NOLA, http://pretrialnola.org/how-pretrial-works/ (last visited May 11, 2016); 
RACIAL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT, Minnesota Task Force Members, 
RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT, http://racialjusticeproject.weebly.com/staff7.html (last 
visited May 11, 2016). 
55 VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, New Orleans Pretrial Services, VERA, 
http://www.vera.org/project/new-orleans-pretrial-services (last visited May 11, 
2016); Minnesota Task Force Members, RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT, 
http://racialjusticeproject.weebly.com/staff7.html (last visited May 11, 2016). 
56 Ham, supra note 53 (475 per 100,000 residents in New Orleans Parish 
compared to 250 per 100,000 nationally). 
57 Wyesondemand, Reshaping a Greater New Orleans:Criminal JUSTICE (last 
updated June 24, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLu0zbkIeJ5ZtrTZI3eTZ8OFZeK3mF1r
mz (noting that in pre-Katrina New Orleans the coordination and cooperation 
between the District Attorney's office and the Police was insufficient to ensure 
that felony arrests were translated into felony prosecutions, resulting in cases of 
fruitless arrests for which defendants were jailed for failure to make bail but 
without an ultimate felony conviction). 
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unnecessarily confining defendants.58 The Vera Institute helped 
design and implement a universal screening procedure after working 
with the various institutional players in the New Orleans criminal 
justice system. This procedure incorporates interviews with 
defendants, the gathering of relevant information prior to the first 
appearance, the use of an “empirical risk-assessment instrument to 
guide release decisions,” post-release defendant supervision, and a 
“court-date reminder system to help defendants.”59  
The risk-assessment procedure begins with an interview shortly 
after arrest—administered in the New Orleans Parish Jail itself—by 
employees of New Orleans Pre-trial Services. This interview covers 
a number of factors that studies have shown to be indicative of the 
risk that defendants pose if released prior to trial: employment and 
job history, family and housing situation, prior convictions and open 
charges, and the nature of the charges, among others.60 The intake 
staff verify the answers by calling employers and family members, 
and confirm criminal history.61 These factors then generate a score 
which represents the degree of risk that the defendant will not appear 
or will commit further offenses prior to trial.62  
The intake interview also represents an opportunity to fulfill 
other essential screening processes, enhancing its utility in and to 
the judicial system. Because the screening already takes account of 
a defendant's employment status and history, as well as assessing 
their financial means, the intake personnel are well situated to make 
an indigency determination.63 The personnel then pass on this 
information to the court, the prosecutor, and the public defender's 
office, affording the latter a chance to get involved in the defendant's 
                                                                                                         
58 VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, New Orleans Pretrial Services, VERA, 
http://www.vera.org/project/new-orleans-pretrial-services (last visited May 11, 
2016). 
59 Id.; TARA BOH KLUTE & LORI EVILLE, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW ORLEANS 
PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NO. 13C1066, at 6 (2013). 
60 Wyesondemand, Reshaping a Greater New Orleans:Criminal JUSTICE (last 
updated June 24, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLu0zbkIeJ5ZtrTZI3eTZ8OFZeK3mF1r
mz (the intake procedure is shown in action in this reportage); KLUTE & EVILLE, 
supra note 59, at 24. 
61 KLUTE & EVILLE, supra note 59, at 5. 
62 Id. at 11–12. 
63 NEW ORLEANS PRETRIAL SERVICES, Services Provided, PRETRIAL NOLA, 
http://pretrialnola.org/services-provided/ (last visited May 11, 2016). 
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case at an earlier point than had been possible prior to the advent of 
the screening process.64 The intake screening also identifies which 
defendants are eligible for the District Attorney's diversion program, 
improving the reach and impact of this program and permitting 
defendants the chance to avoid the consequences of a criminal 
conviction through rehabilitation.65 New Orleans Pre-trial Services 
also takes advantage of the opportunity to put defendants in contact 
with other public services, for example, substance abuse counseling 
or mental health assessment.66  
The role of New Orleans Pre-trial Services does not end after the 
screening process, but instead continues until the defendant's court 
date and involves regular reminders to defendants released on 
personal recognizance or personal surety bonds.67 This involves the 
development of an individualized supervision plan that incorporates 
court and all court-mandated elements, such as electronic 
monitoring, curfews, and drug testing.68  
Pre-trial Services also plays an important role in data collection. 
Because of the expansive nature of the screening questions, Pre-trial 
Services acquires considerable and detailed information on 
defendants, permitting a continuous reevaluation of bail and 
supervision criteria.69 This information also has the potential to aid 
police and prosecutors by indicating which defendants are likely 
recidivists, as well as identifying good candidates for diversion and 
other rehabilitative programs.70 Currently, Pre-trial Services is 
integrating various databases maintained in the criminal justice 
system of New Orleans Parish into a single system, thereby 
eliminating redundancies and improving both access and the value 
of the information provided.71  
The effects of the efforts made by New Orleans Pre-trial 
Services have been overwhelmingly positive. Almost a third of the 
defendants in one sample group were released on personal 
                                                                                                         
64 Id.; ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Diversion Program, ORLEANS DA, 
http://orleansda.com/divisions/diversion-program/ (last visited May 11, 2016).  




69 Id.; KLUTE & EVILLE, supra note 59, at 6–7. 
70 KLUTE & EVILLE, supra note 59, at 7. 
71  NEW ORLEANS PRETRIAL SERVICES, supra note 63.  
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recognizance or a cash bond of less that $2,500; 95 percent of these 
defendants appeared for their court date as required and 96 percent 
committed no further offenses while on release.72 While this release 
rate was lower than the national average, its success rate was 
significantly higher, and proposals have been made to improve post-
intake review procedures to identify defendants who might be 
eligible for release pending trial on non-violent charges.73 
 
2. The Racial Justice Improvement Project in St. Louis County, 
Minnesota 
The Racial Justice Improvement Project (RJIP), launched by the 
ABA in 2010 to “identify and reform policies and practices that 
produce racial disparities in local criminal justice systems,” 
organized a task force in St. Louis County, Minnesota to address the 
disparities in jail time served as a result of failure to post bail.74 St. 
Louis County, which includes the city of Duluth, Minnesota, 
stretches over 170 miles across the northeastern border of that 
state.75 While Native Americans make up only about 2 percent of 
county residents, they comprise a disproportionately high number of 
those arrested and those held in pre-trial detention.76  
To develop methods and practices to address this disparity, the 
RJIP formed a local task force that included the County Attorney, 
the Chief Public Defender, the Deputy Chief of Police, a criminal 
court judge, a representative from the American Indian 
Commission, the head of the local probation office, and a task force 
coordinator (the “Commission”).77  
The Commission first examined the bail practices in Minnesota 
which, under the state's law, permits judges to consider community 
safety, nature and circumstances of the offense, employment, family 
ties, financial resources, prior failures to appear at court, and prior 
                                                                                                         
72  KLUTE & EVILLE, supra note 59, at 8. 
73 Id. at 8–9, 11. 
74 See generally About RJP, RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT, 
http://racialjusticeproject.weebly.com/about-us.html (last visited May 11, 2016); 
THE RACIAL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT, Minnesota Task Force, 
http://racialjusticeproject.weebly.com/minnesota.html (last visited May 11, 
2016); Jones, supra note 53. 
75 Jones, supra note 53, at 946. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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criminal history, among others.78 However, judges were usually not 
aware of this information when making bail determinations and 
“pretrial release reports” were prepared by the probation office only 
upon a judge’s request.79 Initial inquiries indicated that many 
defendants awaiting trial in jail found themselves in that position 
because of their inability to make bail, not because judges had 
deemed them flight risks or dangerous on the basis of relevant 
information.80 An empirical study of pretrial release data revealed 
that Caucasians “were at least twice as likely as other racial 
categories to be released on their own recognizance, and minority 
defendants were more likely to have bail set, even after accounting 
for offense severity level and number of felony charges.”81 The 
Commission also noted race-neutral factors that could account for 
some of the disparate impact on Native Americans. In particular, the 
tendency of judges to set higher bail for persons residing in distant 
locales, like the reservations in the state, was a factor.82  
To address the situation, the Commission first educated both 
arraignment court judges and probation officers of St. Louis County 
about the factors indicating the danger or flight risk posed by 
defendants, as well as the best practices for cases involving low-risk 
defendants released without bail or under supervision.83 Another 
key component for the Commission was ensuring that bail reports 
were available to judges in all felony cases. This in turn required 
working with the probation office to free up resources to produce 
thorough felony bail reports by reducing the number of bail reports 
in misdemeanor and other cases where defendants were likely to be 
released without bail.84  
One part of the response to this situation was the development 
of a new pre-trial risk assessment tool: The tool was crafted in 
cooperation with an expert from the Pretrial Justice Institute and 
included regular procedures for its use so as to reduce the influence 
                                                                                                         
78 Cynthia Jones, Confronting Race in the Criminal Justice System: The ABA's 
Racial Justice Improvement Project, 27 CRIM. JUST. 12, 14–15 (Summer 2012) 
[hereinafter Confronting Race]. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 15. 
82 Id. at 15; Jones, supra note 53, at 949–50. 
83 Jones, supra note 53, at 954. 
84 Id. 
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of individual bias.85 A key component of this procedure is a short 
checklist that reduces multiple recognized factors into a few 
determinative questions; at each phase of the procedure resulting in 
recommended courses of action.86 The first phase ascertains whether 
there are any holds on the defendant through the Minnesota 
Department of Corrections or other jurisdictions and whether the 
defendant is charged with murder or attempted murder. If the answer 
to either of these is “yes” the checklist does not recommend 
completion of a Pre-Trial Release Study, reflecting the fact that these 
factors tend to indicate that higher bail (or perhaps even the refusal 
of bail) is necessary.87  
The next phase moves on to the question of whether the State's 
sentencing guidelines “call for a presumptive stay of . . . imposition 
of sentence” and whether the defendant has a low criminal history 
rating.88 If the answer to both questions is “yes” and the defendant 
is not released on his own recognizance a Pre-Trial Release Study is 
recommended.89 This aims to prompt parole officers and judges to 
reconsider such cases where the defendant is charged with a 
relatively minor crime and has little prior record to indicate any 
likelihood of failing to appear or recidivism. Moreover, if the 
defendant is ultimately not released on personal recognizance, the 
court is asked to “state its reasons either on the record, or in a 
subsequent order.”90 The RJIP continues to work on the pre-trial 
evaluation process and is developing further materials to facilitate 
more just and sustainable alternatives to bail. For example, as of 
2013, the RJIP was in the process of developing a chart that judges 
could use at the bench as a quick reference for appropriate 
alternatives to cash bail.91  
                                                                                                         
85 Id.; ABA RACIAL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT, Pretrial Release 
Considerations, RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT, 
http://racialjusticeproject.weebly.com/minnesota.html (a copy of the pretrial 
release checklist now in use by the probation office and courts in Saint Louis 
County, Minnesota) (last visited May 11, 2016). 
86 Id. 
87 Id.; Jones, supra note 53, at 953–54. 
88 ABA RACIAL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT, supra note 85. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Jones, supra note 53, at 954. 
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Finally, the Commission also made preparations for the 
implementation of regular data collection so that the probation office 
and the courts can reevaluate their practices in the future.92 
 
B. “Get out of Jail Free”: Charitable Bail Bond Agencies in New 
York 
Charitable Bail Bond Agencies (CBBAs) have been tested 
extensively in New York and led the legislature to provide statutory 
language supporting the formation of these charitable agencies.93 
The formation of such an entity by the SRMIR Tribal government, 
in accordance with New York, presents an option for unilateral 
action that is not dependent on the cooperation of any municipal or 
state institutions. However, a CBBA is not without cost or 
controversy—and in any case, would only be able to aid a portion 
of Indian defendants. 
The Vera Institute of Justice launched the first major effort in 
New York to provide bail services to indigent defendants who would 
otherwise spend the pre-trial period in jail.94 The Vera Institute's aim 
from the outset was to create “a pretrial supervision program so good 
that it [could] compete with jail—one that [could] virtually 
guarantee that defendants under supervision [would] neither 
abscond nor commit new crimes.”95 The Vera Institute organized 
bail entities in three New York City area counties, including the 
Bronx. These counties posted bond at no cost to indigent defendants 
in exchange for each defendant's agreement to participate in an 
intensive pre-trial supervision program involving “daily physical 
monitoring of participants.”96  
The pre-trial supervision program created an opportunity for 
meaningful intervention by connecting defendants to substance 
abuse or other therapeutic programs that could have a lasting impact 
                                                                                                         
92 Id. 
93  N.Y. INS §§ 6802, 6805 (2016); Kristen Sanchez, Bail Bond Charity, BRONX 
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2012/33/33_bail_2012_08_16_bx.html (last 
visited May 11, 2016). 
94 Andrea Clisura, Note, None of their Business: The Need for Another 
Alternative to New York’s Bailbond Business, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 307, 322–23 
(2010). 
95 Id. at 323. 
96 Id. at 322. 
2016] Reservation Residents' Bail Catch-22 175 
 
 
on their lives and reduce the likelihood that the defendant would fail 
to appear or be arrested again.97 The defendant's compliance with 
the program requirements could also be deployed at sentencing in 
the defendant's favor; showing the judge that a jail sentence would 
not be necessary.98 However, the program was intense and stringent. 
The program required daily reporting tasks on the part of the 
defendant and constituted a virtual punishment before trial. Since 
the “defendant's freedom [was] . . . restricted in a way that it would 
not have been if the defendant had been able to post bail.”99 The 
restrictive nature of the bail conditions became especially 
impractical in cases where the trial did not take place until months 
after the arrest. Over the course of time, many defendants grew 
frustrated with the bail requirements, leading to more frequent 
infractions against the rules and then increasingly stringent 
requirements.100 Particularly, in the Bronx the wait times were long 
and the rate at which the defendants were returned to jail 
correspondingly high.101 In the end, the Bronx program proved 
unworkable and was shuttered, although the initiatives in the other 
counties continued.102  
The Bronx Freedom Fund effectively picked up in 2007 where 
the Vera Institute had left off.103 Founded by the Bronx Defender, 
the Freedom Fund is a revolving fund that posts bail for indigent 
defendants without any of the hefty supervision requirements 
imposed by the Vera Institute's model.104 Instead, the Freedom Fund 
relies on lower-cost methods of ensuring appearance and ensuring 
return of the funds: maintaining phone and mail contact with 
defendants, making personal visits, requiring third parties to put up 
collateral for the defendants.105 Despite having a smaller staff and a 
less expensive operation than the Vera Institute initiative, the 
Freedom Fund was able to ensure the appearance of the 
                                                                                                         
97 Id. at 323–24. 
98 Id. at 324. 
99 Id. at 323–24. 
100 Id. at 324–25. 
101 Id. at 324–25. 
102 Id. at 326. 
103 Id. at 326–27. 
104 Id. at 336–37. 
105 Id. at 335. 
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overwhelming majority of the defendants, the success rate reaching 
as high as 99 percent in the first months of operation.106  
The Bronx Freedom Fund was briefly placed in a precarious 
position in 2009 when a Bronx County Supreme Court judge refused 
to accept bail from the Freedom Fund, reasoning that it did not fulfill 
the licensing requirements of a bail bond agency under New York's 
Insurance Law § 6801.107 This incident, in turn, provided some of 
the impetus for New York's Charitable Bail Bonds Bill, which was 
passed a little over three years later and expressly permits an 
organization like the Bronx Freedom Fund to operate.108  
New York's “Charitable Bail Organization” Statute, NY CLP Ins 
§ 6805, provides for a licensing process and establishes the 
regulatory framework governing such institutions.109 Section (b) of 
the statute imposes certain restrictions on CBBAs activities. For 
example, they are only permitted to provide bail money on behalf of 
persons “financially unable to post bail”; they may only provide bail 
for amounts of $2,000 or less; and they may only provide bail money 
for misdemeanor offenses.110 Felony offenses and cases where the 
bail determination exceeds $2,000 are entirely excluded from a 
CBBA's scope of activities.111 It is also worth noting that the 
previous and existing CBBAs discussed above operated in an even 
more limited fashion than the statute allowed. For example, the 
Bronx Freedom Fund restricts its activities to clients of the Bronx 
Defender, provides bail only where set for $1,500 or less, and only 
after completion of its evaluation determining the client is not a 
flight risk.112 This has yielded great success in ensuring that the 
                                                                                                         
106 About the Fund, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, 
http://www.thebronxfreedomfund.org/what-we-do/ (last visited May 12, 2016). 
It should also be noted that the Bronx Freedom Fund employs a number of 
selection criteria: 1) only clients of the Bronx Defender are eligible; 2) bail must 
be $1500 or less (lower than the maximum set by the Charitable Bail Bonds 
Law); 3) charge must be a misdemeanor or non-violent felony; 4) the CJA 
assessment shows defendant to be at low risk of flight. Id.; Petrossian, supra 
note 53. 
107 New York v. Miranda, 899 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
108 Kristen Sanchez, Bail Bond Charity, BRONX TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2012/33/33_bail_2012_08_16_bx.html (last 
visited May 11, 2016). 
109 N.Y. INS § 6805(a) (2012). 
110 N.Y. INS §§ 6805(b)(1), (2) (2012). 
111 Id. 
112 BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 106. 
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clients in question made the required court appearances and the pre-
trial release appears to have affected their case outcomes positively. 
However, it is important to recognize that the persons served by the 
Bronx Freedom Fund are a very select group among the broad mass 
of defendants unable to make bail. As a result, it is difficult to predict 
the success of any new CBBA, especially if it serves a wider range 
of indigent defendants.  
 
C. Solutions Hidden in Plain Sight: Alternatives to Detention in 
New York & the SRMIR 
Starting in 2013, New York’s Office of Children and Family 
Services launched a new effort to fund local programming aimed at 
“keep[ing] youth out of detention and/or placement” and included 
support for the “statewide implementation of a validated detention 
risk assessment.”113 Such Alternative to Detention (ATD) Programs 
specifically target those youth who “would, in all likelihood, be in 
detention if the ATD did not exist,” with the aim of ensuring that 
“participating youth return to court without re-arrest.”114  
 Various local ATD Programs incorporate some system of 
reminders and informational assistance for the juvenile defendant 
and his or her family, and features frequent contact with youth and 
family—especially during nights and weekends.115 All ATD 
Programs are required to track certain data metrics so that the 
effectiveness of each program can be measured and further 
development based on empirical information.116 Among the ATD 
models highlighted by the Office of Children and Family Services 
as particularly effective are: Shelter or Respite Beds as a “safe, non-
detention option . . . for youth who cannot currently return to their 
home”; Tracker Programs in which local staff “conduct 
periodic/random home visits to provide support and to ensure that 
                                                                                                         
113 Detention Reform in New York, OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/rehab/drai/ (last visited May 12, 2016); see also 
Improving Juvenile Sentencing Recommendations in NYC, VERA, 
http://www.vera.org/project/improving-juvenile-sentencing-recommendations-
nyc-department-probation (last visited May 12, 2016). 
114 Id. 
115 Detention Reform in New York, supra note 113. 
116 Examples of the data tracked include failure-to-appear rates, re-arrest rates 
while participating in the program, average length of stay within the program 
and all reasons for ending program participation (even those not related to re-
arrest). Detention Reform in New York, supra note 113. 
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youth are adhering to program requirements”; Evening Reporting 
Centers that provide youth with programs of activities to fill their 
evening and weekend times; and Electronic Monitoring combined 
with sobriety support for youth where necessary.117  
The first evaluation of the New York ATD Program was 
performed in 2013 and classified it as “promising,” although at that 
time improvements were not deemed clear enough to rate it as 
definitively “effective.”118 Although it indicated little to no effect on 
the entering of guilty pleas by youth offenders and little change in 
the amount of time they spent in jail, the ATD Program was 
successful in reducing recidivism in the six months following initial 
arrest and decreasing violent felony recidivism.119 Interestingly, at 
that time, the program experienced the greatest gains among youth 
offenders with characteristics indicating a high risk of re-offense.120 
At present 59 counties and municipalities in New York are operating 
ATD Programs of various types, many of them rated “effective” in 
studies funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention.121  
                                                                                                         
117 Id.  
118 See About Model Programs Guide, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Home/About (detailing 
the underlying factors involved in the rating evaluation) (last visted May 12, 
2016); MICHAEL REMPEL, ET AL., THE ADOLESCENT DIVERSION PROGRAM: A 
FIRST YEAR EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL CASE 
PROCESSING FOR DEFENDANTS AGES 16 AND 17 IN NEW YORK v–vi (Center for 
Court Innovation Jan. 2013). 
119 REMPEL, supra 118, at v (8 percent of program participants re-arrested on 
felony charges within six months versus 10 percent of those not participating in 
the program, with re-arrests for violent felonies standing at 4 percent and 5 
percent respectively). 
120 Id. 
121 See 2014-2015 Municipality Plans, OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY 
SERVICES, http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/jj_reform/14-15%20Submitted%20Plans.asp 
(last visited May 12, 2016); Model Programs Guide, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Topic/Details/36 (last visited May 12, 2016). Among 
the “effective” alternatives to detention utilized in New York municipalities are 
“Functional Family Therapy (FFT)” and “Multidimensional Treatment Foster 
Care – Adolescents,” and “Multisystemic Therapy (MST).” Id. Niagara County, 
for example, funds the Casey House, which employs MST programming with 
the goal of connecting youth offenders to key services and reuniting them with 
their family. See STSJP 2014-2015 Annual Plan for Niagara County, OFFICE OF 
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES (2014), 
http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/jj_reform/Niagara%20County/Niagara%20-OCFS-
2121%20Supervision%20and%20Treatment%20Services%20for%20Juvenile%
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Numerous Indian Nations, including the St. Regis Tribal 
government, have set up their own diversion and alternative to 
detention programs for defendants faced with substance abuse 
issues.122 Release under “Community Supervision” has been 
promoted by scholars and implemented by many tribes.123 Such a 
program might encompass individuals on pre-trial release, in a 
diversionary program, or even those convicted of a crime.124 A 2007 
resolution of the American Bar Association proposed the following 
eligibility guidelines for individuals to be admitted to a Community 
Supervision Program, that the offender: 1) does not pose a 
“substantial threat to the community”; 2) does not face charges for 
a crime involving substantial violence; 3) does not have a prior 
criminal history “that makes community supervision an 
inappropriate sanction”; and 4) is not currently on probation.125 The 
precise form that release under Community Supervision takes can 
vary from tribe to tribe, but most involve some reporting 
requirements and involve contact with either the police or another 
agency.  
Among the advantages of Community Supervision is the 
opportunity to engage the offender in therapeutic or rehabilitative 
programs, which have been shown to significantly reduce 
recidivism.126 On the SRMIR, the primary diversion program is 
through the Tribe's Healing to Wellness Drug Court (HWDC), which 
                                                                                                         
20Program%20(STSJP)%20NCDSS%2007-2014%20Revised%2010-29-14.pdf 
(last visited May 12, 2016); see also Nancy Fisher, Casey House provides haven 
for young people needing help, THE BUFFALO NEWS (June 21, 2015), 
http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/niagara-falls/casey-house-provides-
haven-for-young-people-needing-help-20150621. 
122 See Kimberly A. Cobb & Tracy G. Mullins, Tribal Probation: An Overview 
for Tribal Court Judges, 2 J. CT. INNOVATION, 329, 333 (2009) (describing 
guidelines for “community supervision” of tribal members). 
123 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Cobb, Adam Matz & Tracy G. Mullins, Rediscovering 
the Benefits of Community Supervision in Indian Country, 35 PERSPECTIVES 74 
(2011). This work, sponsored by the American Probation & Parole Association 
(APPA), provides an excellent overview of the state of community supervision 
efforts in tribal jurisdictions.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 336–38; CRIME & JUSTICE INST., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE 
INTERVENTIONS 9 (2004), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/019342.pdf (summarizing 
research on the subject). 
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permits both Mohawks and members of other tribes127 to obtain 
treatment in lieu of confinement where the offense in question 
relates to drugs or alcohol, or is a non-violent offense committed 
while under the influence of such substances.128 This program 
encompasses defendants appearing before the Town of Bombay 
Court and involves significant contact and cooperation with New 
York prosecutors in those cases.129 As such, this program, which at 
present provides Tribal members with rehabilitative support in the 
context of plea agreements resulting in convictions, offers a strong 
model for approaches to pre-trial release that would substitute 
supervised participation in therapeutic and rehabilitative programs 
for bail in the form of cash or bond. 
The process of entering the HWDC program begins soon after 
the arrest of a potential participant. Usually the defendant, a relative, 
or the defendant’s attorney takes the initiative.130 The HWDC then 
performs an evaluation, the contents of which remain confidential 
and which covers such diverse items as criminal history, current 
charges, eligibility requirements, and the individual's 
circumstances.131 If the HWDC team determines that the applicant 
meets the eligibility requirements and would be an appropriate 
candidate for the program, an “offer of participation” is made to the 
applicant.132 This is rarely the end of the intake procedure, however, 
as most participants are charged before New York courts (chiefly the 
Town of Bombay Court). As such, consent of the prosecution and 
incorporation of the treatment program in the plea or diversion 
agreement forms a further requirement for participation in the 
HWDC.133 Once the participant has signed the contract with the 
                                                                                                         
127  ST. REGIS MOHAWK TRIBAL HEALING TO WELLNESS DRUG COURT – POLICY 
AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 7 (2012) [hereinafter DRUG COURT POLICY & 
PROCEDURES) (the eligibility criteria provide that the prospective participant 
must be “a member of or eligible for membership in the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe 
[or] a member of another federally recognized tribe”) (document on file with the 
author and the AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL, provided courtesy of the Drug 
Court). 
128 Id. at 7. 
129 Id. at 5. 
130 Id. at 7–8. 
131  DRUG COURT POLICY & PROCEDURES, supra note 127, at 7 (one exception 
exists for mandatory reporting of child abuse). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 8. 
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HWDC and the presiding judge approves the incorporation of the 
treatment regimen, the participant begins the first of the HWDC's 
four phases, each of which incorporates incentives and sanctions.134 
The program offers incentives for cooperation and successful 
completion of steps toward rehabilitation like advancement to 
further phases, lifting of sanctions, and other forms of positive 
reinforcement.135 By contrast, noncompliance with the treatment 
plan results in sanctions levied by the presiding judge in consultation 
with the HWDC and may include increased urine-testing, return to 
earlier treatment phases, electronic monitoring, curfews, or even 
incarceration.136 The HWDC team also meets independently prior to 
a participant's court appearance to evaluate their progress and 
determine what recommendations, if any, need to be made to the 
judge.137  
Although the actual length of treatment varies depending on the 
individual participant's circumstances and behavior, the minimum 
period of treatment is one year, with each of the four phases 
comprising 90 days.138 If at the end of the fourth phase the 
participant meets certain further requirements (e.g., has been 
compliant with court mandates for at least eight months, can show 
sustained employment, has completed any specified program 
requirements) s/he may “graduate” from the program, at which point 
monitoring through the HWDC and the court ends.139 However, 
those participants who desire or need further support can receive it 
through social services. HWDC alumni are also encouraged to stay 
engaged with the program through volunteer work, which creates a 




                                                                                                         
134 Id.; see also SRMT HWDC DRUG COURT CONTRACT TEMPLATE 2–3 
(provided courtesy of the HWDC and on file with the author and the AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW JOURNAL). 
135 DRUG COURT POLICY & PROCEDURES, supra note 127, at 8. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 9 (initially HWDC participants appear in court every week to report 
their progress to the judge). 
138  Id. at 11–15 (the phases are individually termed “Orientation / Choice,” 
“Challenge / Change,” “Connections” and “Transition”). 
139 DRUG COURT POLICY & PROCEDURES, supra note 127, at 15, 19. 
140 Id. at 19. 
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IV. EVALUATING THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF THE REFORM 
INITIATIVES TO THE SRMT'S SITUATION 
While no one of the discussed mechanisms is regarded as 
inherently superior to the others, considerations of cost, benefit, and 
practicability are sketched here to stimulate thought and discussion 
on each option's merits. Although the focus here is on concrete, 
practical solutions to the bail dilemma facing Indian defendants, one 
should neither lose sight of the potential for a constitutional 
challenge to the New York bail regime141 nor discount the potential 
for a fruitful dialogue with members of the New York judiciary. The 
options discussed here are also in no way mutually exclusive and 
may be combined with either each other, with a reform-oriented 
course of cooperation with New York state institutions, or pursued 
subsequent to a constitutional challenge to the validity of New 
York's bail regime, regardless of the outcome. 
 
A. Pre-Trial Risk Assessment & Assuring Appearance 
The introduction of a regime of pre-trial assessment tools and 
processes could significantly reduce the number of SRMIR residents 
who are forced to spend the pre-trial period in jail because of their 
inability to post bail while still ensuring their appearance at court.142 
Working in cooperation with the Town of Bombay Court, the 
SRMIR could develop RAIs based on empirically-tested data that 
would provide intake personnel with an objective measure of the 
likelihood that a defendant would fail to appear. Current programs, 
such as the St. Louis County project detailed above, offer further 
examples of materials and processes that can aid in the evaluation 
of the conditions of release for defendants.143 The proliferation of 
such programs also indicates that the SRMIR and the Town of 
Bombay will have ample opportunity to seek out communities and 
programs that are relevant to their situation and enjoy the advantage 
of learning from others' mistakes.  
                                                                                                         
141 See supra Part II.B. 
142 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 502 (accepting the analysis in 
Baradaran and McIntyre's study, for example, would indicate that over 20 
percent more pre-trial detainees could be released). 
143 Jones, supra note 53, at 946 (The Racial Justice Improvement Project is 
emphasized here because it dealt specifically with reservation residents who 
were detained pre-trial in disproportionate numbers and as such may have 
greater relevance to the situation of SRMIR residents.). 
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Furthermore, a pre-trial assessment regime opens the door to 
other rehabilitative options, as exemplified in the Alternative to 
Detention programs recently supported by New York.144 For 
defendants suffering from substance abuse issues, who require 
counseling, or could otherwise benefit from available public 
services, the moment of contact with intake personnel represents an 
opportunity to fundamentally change the course of their lives for the 
better. A number of the programs supported by New York could 
serve as prime examples.145 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember this solution that 
requires close cooperation with the court system of the Town of 
Bombay, which in turn necessitates negotiations and discussion of 
its development and the associated costs. Such a program would 
require at a minimum the preparation and training of probation and 
court personnel, and perhaps even the creation of specific intake 
positions, as in the case of New Orleans Parish described above.146 
The Town of Bombay and SRMIR would have to decide how to 
divide these costs, which could prove controversial in both 
communities. Still, a pre-trial assessment program would benefit not 
only the SRMIR residents but also residents of the Town of Bombay. 
The fact that the pre-trial assessment regimes discussed here were 
implemented in urban areas should not discourage the SRMIR nor 
the Town of Bombay since many rural areas in New York have also 
implemented such assessments.147 
 
B. A Tribal Charitable Bail Bond Agency 
The SRMIR could set up a CBBA to post bail for SRMIR 
residents charged with misdemeanors in the Town of Bombay. 
Because a CBBA set up for SRMIR residents would have to post 
                                                                                                         
144 Detention Reform in New York, supra note 113 (listing examples of 
intervention-oriented programs that have been attempted by New York 
communities). 
145 Id. 
146 Why Pretrial Services, NEW ORLEANS PRETRIAL SERVICES, available at 
http://pretrialnola.org/how-pretrial-works/ (last visited May 12, 2016); 
Wyesondemand, supra note 57. 
147See CRIME JUSTICE INSTITUTE, ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL SERVICES IN NEW 
YORK STATE 16, 23, 28 (2014) (including survey data from a variety of rural 
New York counties), available at 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/opca/pdfs/NYS-Pretrial-Release-Report-7-1-
2014.pdf. 
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bail before a court (or, potentially, courts) in New York, it would 
have to meet the requirements set forth in NY CLS Ins § 6802 and 
§ 6805, including: (1) organization as a 501(c)(3) for federal tax 
purposes148; (2) registration as a charitable organization in New 
York; (3) obtaining the proper certification from the State; (4) 
ensuring that its employees are properly licensed; (5) restricting its 
bail posting to “amount[s] of two thousand dollars or less for a 
defendant charged with one or more misdemeanors”; and (6) 
depositing funds in only one county in the State.149 Although there 
is no statutory bar to a 501(c)(3) organized under tribal law 
registering as a charity in New York, it does constitute an additional 
registration that a CBBA would have to undertake beyond the 
certification and licensing with the Superintendent of Financial 
Services.150  
In assessing whether a CBBA would be an appropriate solution 
to the bail-related issues facing SRMIR residents, the Tribe would 
have to consider the expense and effort required to establish such an 
institution. As noted above, beyond the initial (federally focused) 
organization of a 501(c)(3) there remains much to do: registration as 
a charitable organization, certification process, and licensing of 
employees, all of which would claim man-hours and resources of 
the SRMIR, and in the case of the CBBA's certification, would re-
occur every five years.151  
The SRMIR would also have to provide the initial capital for the 
CBBA's fund, a one-time cost if it successfully functions as a 
revolving fund along the lines of the Bronx Freedom Fund. To make 
a CBBA sustainable there would have to be some sort of selective 
process by which the CBBA would decide which residents posed a 
flight risk or would be unlikely to appear at their court date, as 
posting bail in such cases could quickly deplete the fund.152 
                                                                                                         
148 I.R.C. § 501(c) (2016). 
149 N.Y, INS § 6805 (2012). 
150 N.Y. EXEC § 172 (2016). 
151 N.Y. INS §§ 6805(4), (5) (renewal of certification also carries a fee of $1000, 
although the Superintendent of Financial Services may waive this fee). 
152 See BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 106. Despite the fact that the Bronx 
Freedom Fund already limits itself to clients of the Bronx Defender it further 
excludes those clients who are deemed at risk of flight/non-appearance 
following an evaluation, which therefore comprise only a fraction of those 
unable to post bail. Petrossian, supra note 53. 
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Depending on the number of persons that such an evaluation 
excluded, one might reasonably ask whether the benefits of a CBBA 
could justify the costs. 
Finally, there is the question of public reaction to a CBBA, both 
within the SRMIR and in the Town of Bombay. SRMIR residents 
might reasonably question the decision to apply tribal resources to 
bailing persons out of jail, particularly as some might view this as 
effectively subsidizing bad behavior. The establishment of such a 
CBBA could also generate a degree of resentment among Town of 
Bombay residents, who might view the CBBA's activities as 
offering an unfair advantage to defendants from the SRMIR while 
other indigent defendants had to sit out their pre-trial time in jail. 
The possible effect of a CBBA on the relationship between the 
communities should figure prominently in any consideration of the 
CBBA option. 
 
C. Coordinating New York and Tribal Alternative to Detention 
Programs 
As detailed above, New York employs a range of Alternative to 
Detention Programs for juvenile offenders, many of which could 
prove effective in addressing the concerns of the Town of Bombay 
Court while obviating the need for bail. The variety and breadth of 
ATD Programs in New York show that New York municipalities, on 
the local level, are no strangers to such efforts. With regard to the 
SRMIR residents appearing before the Town of Bombay Court there 
is no need to develop new procedures from scratch, as the Tribal 
government's Healing to Wellness Drug Court has been working in 
cooperation with local prosecutors and the court for several years. 
Two hurdles to securing a SRMIR defendant's release into one 
of these programs on a pre-trial basis is development of appropriate 
procedures by the HWDC and coordination between it and the Town 
of Bombay Court.153 In principle, the relevant changes would be 
limited to adapting the HWDC's existing program to the unique 
aspects of a defendant's circumstances as opposed to a convict's. In 
fact, the HWDC in its early phase engaged with participants on pre-
trial release but later discontinued this practice due to the difficulty 
of imposing sanctions on non-cooperative participants. While this 
                                                                                                         
153 DRUG COURT POLICY & PROCEDURES, supra note 127, at 9. 
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may have been the appropriate decision at that point in time, some 
of the incentive issues could be resolved by conditioning pre-trial 
release on adherence to the program's parameters, with the ultimate 
sanction of pre-trial incarceration available to the court and HWDC. 
The main task would be to obtain the court's cooperation in crafting 
the pre-trial release conditions, which might reasonably fit in the 
categories of unsecured appearance bonds.154 The release would be 
conditioned on participation in the program and attendance at all 
corresponding court appearances. Otherwise, the existing HWDC 
procedures in cooperation with prosecutors and the court would 
continue to function more or less as is.  
Utilization of such a diversion program would benefit the Town 
by reducing the jail population and, if ultimately successful in 
preventing recidivism, will lighten the burden on the Town's 
judiciary and police. Nevertheless, the Town is under no obligation 
to cooperate and could spurn such a proposed procedural change, 
either for cost and difficulty, or even to avoid the perception that it 
treats Indian defendants more favorably. Still, strong arguments can 
be made for cost and social benefits to the Town of Bombay: the 
SRMIR actually covers the cost of the diversion program itself, the 
Town would save the costs of detaining an Indian defendant, and the 
prospect of a decline in recidivism and crime is a substantial 
incentive in its own right.  
Such a diversionary program is by no means a panacea for the 
pre-trial dilemma facing many Indian defendants. Many of the 
affected SRMIR residents may not be eligible for diversion, 
particularly if they have extensive prior criminal convictions that 
could make them ineligible for the program. Others might simply 
not fall within its scope, as it is geared toward defendants suffering 
from substance abuse issues.155 Even a limited improvement for 
such recidivism could yield benefits for the Bombay court docket 
and the community at large. If the town and its court are willing to 
cooperate with the Tribal court and authorities, it is not overly 
                                                                                                         
154 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 520.10 (2006). 
155 See infra APPENDIX II. Nevertheless, among the top five charges filed against 
recidivists on pre-trial release, one (Driving While intoxicated, 1st Offense) was 
alcohol-related and all alcohol-related charges together made up just a little less 
than 10 percent of all recidivist charges. While these form a minority of 
recidivist offenses, they are certainly not insignificant. 
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optimistic to expect the release of many of the tribal members who 
would otherwise spend extended periods of time in pre-trial 
detention at great cost to themselves and their community. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article does not endorse any specific reform initiative in 
responding to Indian defendant's difficulties in making bail. 
Nevertheless, having briefly assessed the merits of the various 
options and the obstacles facing their implementation, the author 
would like to recommend some guiding principles to any tribe that 
seeks to address this issue. 
As mentioned at the beginning of Part IV, none of the options 
are mutually exclusive and can be combined with one another or 
other approaches largely as a tribe would see fit. Moreover, despite 
the utility of these reform approaches, there exist other potential 
axes of advance in addressing the bail conundrum facing Indian 
defendants. The author would recommend that tribes keep their 
options open and structure their efforts along a principle of 
“progressive escalation,” where the tribal government can at first 
pursue low-cost and politically “palatable” solutions before 
pursuing options that either require a more serious commitment of 
resources (such as the programs described in this Article) or have 
the potential to burden the tribe's relationship with a state (such as 
challenging the constitutionality of a state's bail regime). 
Initially, a tribe should seek out dialogue with the state or states 
in which their territory is located and where their members are most 
commonly arrested. As the RJIP efforts in Duluth, Minnesota, 
demonstrate, judges are often receptive to practices that obviate the 
need for bail bonds. Moreover, inducing judges to alter the way in 
which they assess bail may not require anything as formal as the 
solution developed by the RJIP example. In some cases, tribes may 
already have effective forums available to them in seeking dialogue 
with the state judiciary; the justices of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal 
Court, for example, participate in a State-Tribe Court Commission 
in which they are joined by state judges and Federal officials and 
where they can air their concerns and proposals for cooperative 
action. If this avenue yields no satisfactory result, the tribe can 
consider some of the concrete reform efforts described in this 
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Article, whether in cooperation with state courts and agencies (e.g., 
developing Risk-Assessment Instruments or developing procedures 
for release to Tribal Rehabilitative Programs) or unilaterally (as with 
a Charitable Bail Bond Agency, where possible). Finally, a 
constitutional challenge to a state's bail regime remains a possibility, 
although the prospects for success are questionable, as outlined in 
Part II.B. This option should probably be held in reserve until all or 
most others have been exhausted. While such a constitutional 
challenge does not necessarily preclude the pursuit of other 
approaches, it could complicate cooperation with state agencies and 
courts. Such a challenge also carries a degree of risk, as an adverse 
decision would essentially permit the state in question (and others 
with similar bail regimes) to proceed as before and reduce the 
incentive to cooperate with a tribe in seeking solutions to this bail 
issue. The threat of a constitutional challenge, even an unspoken or 
only implicit one, might yield results more quickly and at a lower 
cost. 
Although this Article has sought to identify and discuss aspects 
of this problem and possible solutions in broad terms, case studies 
of other tribes' circumstances could be worthwhile. Tribe-to-tribe 
difference in land regimes (i.e., federal trust or tribal control), 
variations in state court procedures and policies, as well as differing 
degrees of cooperation and communication between tribes and states 
all warrant additional examination. Once a broader picture of the 
Indian defendant's bail conundrum is produced, and other Indian 
tribes' options and responses are analyzed it may even be possible 
to develop a standardized approach or launch common efforts to 
resolve the bail issue. 
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APPENDIX I: CHARGES, BAIL AMOUNT, RELEASE DATE & 
REASON: APRIL 1– JULY 31, 2014 
 
A. Charge Information 
 




Native Male 5 0 $27,000  $54,000  
Native Male 0 1 $0  $0  
Native Male 4 0 $16,000  $32,000  
Native Male 0 1 $50,000  $100,000  
Native Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
Native Male N/A N/A $1,700  $3,400  
Native Male 1 0 $0  $0  
Native Male 1 0 $5,000  $10,000  
Native Male 1 0 $0  $0  
Native Male 1 0 $1,500  $3,000  
Native Female 0 1 $0  $0  
Native Female 0 1 $10,000  $20,000  
Native Male 1 1 $4,500  $0  
Native Male N/A N/A $6,000  $12,000  
Native Male 2 3 $0  $0  
Native Male 1 0 $10,000  $20,000  
Native Male 1 0 $0  $0  
Native Male 4 2 $140,000  $280,000  
Native Male 1 0 $5,000  $10,000  
Native Male 2 0 $2,000  $4,000  
Native Male 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
Native Male N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Native Male 2 0 $18,000  $36,000  
Native Male 0 1 $0  $0  
Native Female 1 0 $500  $1,000  
Native Male 0 0 $0  $0  
Native Male 1 2 $21,000  $42,000  
Native Male 2 0 $3,000  $6,000  
Native Male 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
Native Male 3 2 $5,000  $10,000  
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Native Male 0 2 $0  $0  
Native Male 3 0 $3,000  $6,000  
Native Male 0 1 $10,000  $20,000  
Native Female 4 1 $15,000  $30,000  
Native Male 1 0 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 2 1 $0  $0  
White Male N/A N/A $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 1 3 $7,000  $14,000  
White Male N/A N/A $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 1 1 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 1 0 $500  $1,000  
White Male 0 1 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 2 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 0 2 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 1 1 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 2 0 $0  $0  
White Male 2 0 $3,000  $6,000  
White Male 1 2 $0  $0  
White Female 1 2 $7,500  $15,000  
White Male N/A N/A $45,000  $90,000  
White Male 1 1 $7,500  $15,000  
White Male 2 0 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Female 0 1 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 3 0 $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $1,000  $2,000  
White Female 3 0 $3,000  $6,000  
White Male 2 1 $20,000  $40,000  
White Male 0 2 $15,000  $30,000  
White Male 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
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White Male 2 6 $115,000  $230,000  
White Male 1 1 $0  $0  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $5,000  $10,000  
White Female 0 1 $2,500  $5,000  
White Male 1 1 $20,000  $40,000  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 2 0 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 3 0 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 0 2 $3,000  $6,000  
White Male 1 0 $4,500  $9,000  
White Female 1 0 $3,000  $6,000  
White Male 0 2 $20,000  $40,000  
White Male 0 1 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male 0 2 $20,000  $40,000  
White Male 1 4 $0  $0  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male N/A N/A N/A N/A 
White Male N/A N/A N/A N/A 
White Male 1 0 $2,500  $5,000  
White Male 0 1 $10,000  $20,000  
White Female 0 1 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 2 0 $3,000  $6,000  
White Male 2 0 $1,200  $2,400  
White Female N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 0 3 $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $20,000  $40,000  
White Male N/A N/A $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Female N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Female 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $500  $1,000  
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White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 3 0 $7,500  $15,000  
White Male 1 1 $0  $0  
White Male 2 0 $2,000  $0  
White Male 1 0 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 0 1 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 0 1 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Female 1 0 $0  $0  
White Female 2  0 $500  $1,000  
White Male 2 1 $7,500  $15,000  
White Male 1 0 $25,000  $50,000  
White Male 1 2 $0  $0  
White Male 5 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $25,000  $50,000  
White Male 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 4 0 $12,000  $24,000  
White Female 2 0 $0  $0  
White Female N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male N/A N/A N/A N/A 
White Male 1 1 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male N/A N/A $500  $1,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $500  $1,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 3 0 $2,000  $4,000  
White Female N/A N/A $0  $0  
2016] Reservation Residents' Bail Catch-22 193 
 
 
White Male 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Female 1 0 $3,000  $6,000  
White Male 1 0 $3,500  $7,000  
White Female 1 0 $2,500  $5,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $15,000  $30,000  
White Male 1 1 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Female 1 0 $2,000  $4,000  
White Female 0 2 $45,000  $90,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $2,000  $4,000  
White Male 4 0 $11,000  $22,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Female 4 1 $25,000  $50,000  
White Female 3 0 $15,000  $30,000  
White Female 3 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $0  $0  
White Female 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Female 0 1 $1,000  $2,000  
White Female 0 0 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 0 0 $0  $0  
White Female 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 1 0 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $500  $1,000  
White Female 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 3 0 $3,000  $6,000  
White Female 2 0 $10,000  $20,000  
White Male 2 5 $60,000  $120,000  
White Female 2 0 $1,500  $3,000  
White Female 2 0 $6,000  $12,000  
White Male 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
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White Male 1 1 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 0 1 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male 1 1 $4,000  $8,000  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 3 2 $15,000  $30,000  
White Male 1 0 $1,000  $0  
White Male 1 1 $8,000  $16,000  
White Female 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $60,000 $120,000  
White Male 1 0 $500  $1,000  
White Female 1 0 $1,500  $3,000  
White Female 1 0 $500  $1,000  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Female 2 0 $0  $0  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Female 0 1 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male 0 3 $0  $0  
White Female N/A N/A $750  $1,500  
White Female 2 0 $3,000  $6,000  
White Male N/A N/A $3,000  $6,000  
White Female 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
White Male 0 0 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $2,500  $5,000  
White Male 2 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $1,500  $3,000  
White Male 1 1 $100,000  $200,000  
White Male 1 1 $30,000  $60,000  
White Male 1 0 $2,000  $4,000  
White Female N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Female 0 2 $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $20,000  $40,000  
White Female 2 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Female 1 0 $2,500  $5,000  
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White Female 0 5 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 7 2 $176,000  $355,000  
White Female 2 1 $32,500  $65,000  
White Male 3 1 $110,000  $220,000  
White Male 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male N/A N/A $0  $0  
White Female 0 1 $2,500  $5,000  
White Female 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 1 1 $0  $0  
White Male 2 0 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 0 1 $5,000  $10,000  
White Female 0 1 $0  $0  
White Female N/A N/A $1,500  $3,000  
White Female 1 0 $1,000  $2,000  
White Male 0 1 $5,000  $10,000  
White Male 0 1 $20,000  $40,000  
White Female 1 0 $0  $0  
White Male 2 0 $0  $0  
White Male 0 1 $0  $0  
 
 
196 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:156 
 
 
B. Statistical Summary 
 
 Avg. # of 
Misdemean
ors 










Native 1.419354839 0.542857143 $10,320.00 $20,382.86 5 15.15151515 
White 0.87745098 0.676470588 $6,896.81 $13,778.92 42 20.68965517 





61.8000% 24.7200% 49.6300% 47.9200%   
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APPENDIX II—BOMBAY COURT DOCKET RECIDIVISM: 




Race Age Arrest/Ticket.Date Charge.Description Docket.Date VTL PL. Other Police.Agency Mis. Fel.
Native 20 5/6/2014 Petit.Larceny,.Agg.Unlic.Op.3 5/13/2014 1 1 0 State.Police 2 0
6/3/2014 Agg.Unlic.Op.3,.Lane.vio 6/24/2014 2 0 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 26 5/28/2012 Crim.Misch.4,.Endan.Wel.x2,.Harassment.2nd 4/22/2014 0 4 0 SRMT 3 0
10/1/2012 Agg.Unlic.Op.3,.Unlic.Driver,.Speeding 4/22/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0
12/12/2013 Obstruct.Breath,.Menacing.2,.Endan.Wel 4/22/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 3 0
4/22/2014 Escape.3,.Obs.govt.admin.2,.Assault.3 5/6/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 3 0
Native 27 11/17/2012 Crim.Contempt.1,.Harrsmt.2,.disord.con. 7/8/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 0 1
1/13/2013 Crim.Contempt.1,.resist.arst,.disord.con. 7/8/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 1 1
3/31/2014 Agg.Unlic.Op.2,.Poss.Marih,.vio.tail.lamps,.unlic.drvr,.misc.vtl.vio 7/8/2014 4 1 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 37 11/9/2009 Burg.3,.Crim.Misch..4,.Crim.Tres..2,.Harrsmt.2 4/22/2014 0 4 0 State.Police 2 1
4/5/2012 Agg.Unlic.Op.2,.Lane.vio,.Lv.scn.accdnt,.unlic.drv 7/15/2014 4 0 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 57 N/A harassment.2 5/13/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 0
5/6/2014 Agg.Harass.2 5/13/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 30 1/23/2011 rckls.drvng,.unlic.class.drvr,.imprdnt.spd,.flw.too.cls,.lv.scn.accdnt 4/29/2014 5 0 0 SRMT 1 0
1/14/2014 Assault.3 4/15/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 23 10/3/2013 Agg.Unlic.Op.3,.lane.vio 4/1/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
4/1/2014 Petit.Larceny 4/29/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 1 0
5/6/2014 Poss.Marih.,.veh.equip.vio 6/24/2014 1 1 0 State.Police 0 0
Native 20 7/17/2012 Reck.endang.1,.obs.govt.admn.2,.resist.arst,.crim.tres.2 4/22/2014 0 4 0 State.Police 3 1
5/15/2014 .Sentence.violation 5/27/2014 0 0 1 State.Police 0 0
Native 46 10/9/2013 Burglary.2 4/8/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 0 1
1/7/2014 Petit.Larceny 6/24/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 21 10/14/2012 DWI.1st.Off,.DWAI.Alc,.Unlic.drv,.Poss.Marih,.spdng,.reg.vio,.no.insp 7/29/2014 8 1 0 SRMT 1 0
6/4/2013 poss.marih. 7/29/2014 1 0 0 SRMT 0 0
7/12/2014 DWI.1st.Off,.DWI.08.of.1PCT,.Agg.Unlic.Op.3 7/29/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 3 0
7/22/2014 Agg.Unlic.Op.3,.DWI.1st.Off,.DWI.08.of.1PCT 7/29/2014 3 0 0 State.Police 3 0
Native 23 N/A Sentence.violation 4/29/2014 0 0 1 State.Police 0 0
6/19/2014 Criminal.Contempt.1 7/8/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 1
Native 24 4/10/2010 Flee.Officr.3rd,.Agg.Harass.2 4/29/2014 0 2 0 SRMT 2 0
4/25/2013 speeding,.DwI.08.of.1PCT,.DWI.1st.Offense 4/29/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 2 0
9/1/2013 Obs.govt.admin.2,.lv.scn.accdnt 4/15/2014 1 1 0 SRMT 1 0
11/20/2013 Agg.Harass.2,.stalking.4th 4/15/2014 0 2 0 SRMT 2 0
1/17/2014 probation.violation 7/29/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 0 0
Native 28 12/18/2011 Agg.Unlic.op.2,.reckless.drvg.x2,.fail.keep.right,.spdng,.lane.vio,.imprudent.spd 5/6/2014 7 0 0 SRMT 3 0
1/13/2012 Crim.poss.weap.3&4,.cpcs.7.x2,.poss.hypo.inst,.poss.marih,.cont.sub.vio.x4 5/6/2014 0 6 4 SRMT 3 1
Native 25 9/13/2011 Speeding,.Agg.unlic.op.3 4/22/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
3/27/2013 Speeding,.Agg.unlic.op.3 4/22/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 27 8/15/2013 Menace.2nd.x2,.Endan.wel.child.x2 5/20/2014 0 4 0 SRMT 4 0
3/15/2014 Agg.unlic.op.3,.unlic.op,.unaut.use.veh.3 5/20/2014 2 1 0 SRMT 1 1
3/21/2014 Sentence.Violation 4/8/2014 0 0 1 SRMT 0 0
3/21/2014 Harass.2,.Reck.endang.2 4/8/2014 0 2 0 SRMT 1 0
4/13/2014 Trespass 5/20/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 0
Native 41 N/A Unaut.use.veh.3 5/20/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 1 0
8/6/2013 Speeding,.Agg.unlic.op.3 7/22/2014 2 0 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 29 9/18/2009 Agg.unlic.op.2 4/22/2014 1 0 0 State.Police 1 0
3/25/2011 Harassment.2 4/22/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 0
12/1/2012 Agg.unlic.op.3,.fail.keep.right 4/22/2014 2 0 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 23 3/12/2013 DWI.1st.Off,.Agg.DWI,.fail.keep.right,.lane.vio,.fail.comp.ord,.school.zone 4/22/2014 6 0 0 State.Police 2 0
6/11/2013 Aggravated.DWI 4/22/2014 1 0 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 19 3/5/2013 DWI.1st.Off,.DWI.08.of.1pct,.lv.scn.accdnt,.unaut.use.veh.3,.unlic.drvr 4/29/2014 4 1 0 State.Police 3 0
5/24/2014 Crim.Misch.2.x2,.cpsp.5,.flee.ofcr.3,.DWI.1st,.DWI.08.of.1pct 6/17/2014 12 4 0 SRMT 5 2
5/27/2014 Petit.Larceny 6/17/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 1 0
Native 25 4/11/2013 Stop.sign.vio,.Viol.misc.rules 7/29/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 0 0
5/8/2011 Assault.3 6/17/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 35 4/15/2003 cpsp.4,.reck.endang.2 5/6/2014 0 2 0 State.Police 1 1
10/12/2011 disord.conduct 6/17/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 0
4/5/2013 Atv.op.vio.x3,.atv.equp.vio,.harass.2,.disord.cndct,.misc.vio 4/8/2014 5 2 0 SRMT 0 0
Native 36 2/3/2014 agg.unlic.op.3,.vio.tail.lamps 6/17/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
2/15/2014 agg.unlic.op.3,.unlic.driver,.vio.tail.lamps 4/22/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 48 9/27/2012 DWI.1st.off,.agg.unlic.op.2,.lane.vio,.resist.arst,.harass.2,.disord.conduct,.breath.test.vio4/8/2014 4 3 0 SRMT 3 0
11/30/2012 agg.unlic.op.2 4/8/2014 1 0 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 29 11/2/2013 harass.2. 5/6/2014 0 1 0 State.Police 0 0
11/13/2013 menacing.2 5/6/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 1 0
3/18/2014 veh.equp.vio 4/15/2014 1 0 0 N/A 0 0
Native 25 3/23/2011 burglary.3,.cpsp.3,.grand.larceny.3 4/22/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 0 3
10/3/2012 agg.unlic.op.3,.unlic.driver,.lane.vio 4/8/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0















































Native 28 10/31/2012 resist/arst,/crim/misch/4,/harass/2,/disord/conduct 6/17/2014 0 4 0 SRMT 2 0
12/3/2013 probation/violation 5/6/2014 0 0 1 State/Police 0 0
12/9/2013 poss/hypo/inst,/cpcs/7 4/8/2014 0 2 0 SRMT 2 0
Native 48 12/4/2012 speeding,/unlic/operation 6/3/2014 2 0 0 State/Police 1 0
2/4/2014 speeding,/agg/unlic/op/2 6/3/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
4/1/2014 unlic/driver,/unlic/operation 6/3/2014 2 0 0 State/Police 1 0
Native 40 8/12/2004 agg/unlic/op/3,/unlic/driver,/seat/belt/violation 5/6/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 1 0
12/11/2010 imprudent/speed,/agg/unlic/op/3 5/6/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
4/1/2011 crim/contempt/2 5/6/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 23 10/31/2013 speeding,/agg/unlic/op/3 4/8/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
2/1/2014 DWI/1st/Off,/DWI/08/of/1pct,/vio/lights 4/8/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 2 0
Native N/A N/A Sealed 5/13/2014 N/A N/A N/A SRMT N/A N/A
N/A Sealed 5/13/2014 N/A N/A N/A SRMT N/A N/A
N/A Sealed 5/13/2014 N/A N/A N/A SRMT N/A N/A
Native 24 8/6/2013 agg/unlic/op/2,/unlic/driver,/no/insp/cert 5/13/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 1 0
2/24/2013 burglary/3,/crim/mischief/3 4/15/2014 0 2 0 SRMT 0 2
1/7/2014 unlic/drvr,/fail/keep/right,/unlic/op,/fail/comp/ord,/num/plate/vio 5/13/2014 5 0 0 State/Police 1 0
Native 22 3/7/2013 Agg/asslt,/crim/misch/3/x2,/endan/wel,/reck/endang/2,/rckls/drvg 4/22/2014 6 5 0 SRMT 3 3
N/A sentence/violation 4/22/2014 0 0 1 State/Police 0 0
Native 30 7/14/2008 Assault/2nd 5/20/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 1
8/30/2008 crim/mischief/3/x2,/assault/3 5/20/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 1 2
9/10/2011 reckls/drvng/x2,/agg/unlic/op/2,/flee/ofcr/3,/veh/equp/vio,/spdng 5/20/2014 20 1 0 SRMT 4 0
9/30/2013 resist/arrest 5/20/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 1
3/11/2014 no/insp/cert,/unlic/op,/unlic/driver 4/8/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 1 0
Native 21 11/1/2013 DWI/1st/Off,/DWI/08/of/1pct,/imprdnt/speed,/obs/govt/admin/2 4/29/2014 4 1 0 SRMT 3 0
4/26/2014 reckls/drvng,/flee/ofcr/3,/resist/arst,/fail/keep/right,/spdng,/etc 5/20/2014 7 2 0 State/Police 3 0
Native 27 7/9/2013 lane/violation,/agg/unlic/op/2 4/15/2014 2 0 0 State/Police 1 0
1/25/2014 fail/keep/right,/unlic/driver,/unlic/operation 4/15/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 30 8/18/2011 agg/unlic/op/2,/unlic/driver,/no/insp/cert 6/17/2014 1 0 0 SRMT 1 0
9/6/2012 DWI/1st/off,/agg/unlic/1,/vio/lights,/unlic/drvr,/breath/test/vio,/etc 5/27/2014 8 0 0 SRMT 1 1
12/27/2013 burglary/3,/petit/larceny 5/27/2014 0 2 0 SRMT 1 1
Native 25 5/25/2013 agg/unlic/op/3,/speeding,/vio/tail/lamps 4/29/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0
11/1/2013 endang/wel,/DWI/1st,/agg/DWI,/imprudent/speed,/agg/unlic/op/3 4/29/2014 4 1 0 SRMT 4 0
11/6/2013 agg/unlic/op/3 4/29/2014 1 0 0 State/Police 1 0
Native 32 1/28/2013 reck/endang/1,/strangulation/2,/endan/wel/child 4/8/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 1 2
4/4/2013 harass/1,/crim/contempt/2/x2 4/8/2014 0 3 0 SRMT 3 0
10/2/2013 crim/contempt/2 4/8/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 1 0
N/A harassment/2 4/8/2014 0 1 0 SRMT 0 0
Native 24 2/11/2009 no/insp/cert,/agg/unlic/op/3 7/1/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
7/31/2012 agg/unlic/op/3,/follow/too/close 7/1/2014 2 0 0 SRMT 1 0
6/17/2014 vio/tail/lamps,/DWI/1st/off,/DWI/08/of/1pct 7/1/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 2 0
Native 32 12/4/2010 agg/unlic/op/2,/unlic/driver,/vio/tail/lamps 7/22/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0
1/28/2012 agg/unlic/op/2,/speeding,/unlic/driver 6/24/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0
Native 23 10/4/2012 DWI/1st/off,/DWI/08/of/1pct,/fail/dim/lights 4/8/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 2 0
8/6/2013 DWI/1st/off,/DWI/08/of/1pct,/fail/keep/right 4/8/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 2 0
Native 31 12/18/2013 Petit/Larceny 4/29/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 1 0
1/7/2014 Disord/conduct,/harassment/2 4/29/2014 0 2 0 State/Police 0 0
Native 24 1/7/2014 unlic/driver,/agg/unlic/op/3,/speeding 4/29/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 1 0
1/14/2014 agg/unlic/op/3,/no/insp/cert 4/1/2014 2 0 0 State/Police 1 0
Native 31 3/12/2011 DWI/1st/off,/DWI/08/of/1pct,/agg/unlic/1,/fail/keep/right 6/24/2014 4 0 0 SRMT 2 1
5/20/2014 unlic/driver,/registration/vio,/agg/unlic/op/2 6/10/2014 3 0 0 State/Police 1 0
Native 23 1/23/2012 agg/unlic/op/3,/speeding,/unlic/driver 5/20/2014 3 0 0 SRMT 1 0
2/4/2014 speeding 4/8/2014 1 0 0 State/Police 0 0
Native 35 3/31/2012 veh/equip/vio,/agg/unlic/op/3,/endan/wel,/cpcs/4,5/&/7 6/17/2014 2 4 0 SRMT 2 2
3/11/2014 burglary/3 4/22/2014 0 1 0 State/Police 0 1
229 118 9 146 31
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B. Charge Tally 
Charges Tally grand-larceny-3 1 Veh-Equip-Vio 4
agg-assault 1 harassment-1 1 veh-regis-susp 1
Agg-DWI 3 harassment-2 12 vio-lights 2
Agg-Harss-2 3 imp-pass-on-right 1 vio-misc-rules 4
Agg-unlic-1 2 imprudent-speed 6 vio-tail-lamps 6
Agg-Unlic-Op-2 14 Lane-Violation 12
Agg-Unlic-Op-3 26 Lv-Scn-Accdnt 4
assault-2 1 menacing-2 4
Assault-3 4 misc-violation 1
ATV-equip-vio 1 misc-vtl-violation 1 Agg-Unlic-Op-3 26
ATV-op-vio 3 no-insp-cert 9 Unlic-Driver 22
breath-test-vio 2 no-safety-glass 1 Speeding 20
Burglary-2 1 num-plate-violation 3 DWI-1st-Off 16
Burglary-3 5 Obstruct-Breath 1 Agg-Unlic-Op-2 14
cont-sub-vio 4 obs-govt-admin-2 4
cpcs-4 1 Op-MV-alc-under-21 1 TOTAL-CHARGES: 358
cpcs-5 1 op-MV-no-ins 1 #-AlcoholSrelated: 35 %-of-Total: 10
cpcs-7 4 Petit-Larceny 6
cpsp-3 1 poss-hypo-inst 2
cpsp-4 1 Poss-Marih 5
cpsp-5 1 probation-violation 2
Crim-Contempt-1 3 Reck-endang-1- 2
Crim-Contempt-2 4 reck-endang-2 3
crim-misch-2 2 reckless-drvng 8
Crim-misch-3 5 Registration-vio 3
Crim-Misch-4 3 Resist-Arrest 6
crim-pos-weap-3 1 school-zone 1
crim-pos-weap-4 1 SEALED 3
Crim-Tres-2 2 seat-belt-violation 1
disob-trfc-device 1 sentence-violation 4
Disord-Conduct 7 speeding 20
DWAI-Alcohol 1 stalking-4 1
DWI-08-of-1pct 11 stop-sign-violation 2
DWI-1st-Offense 16 strangulation-2 1
endan-wel-child 9 trespass 1
Escape-3 1 turn-signal-vio 5
fail-comp-order 4 unauth-use-veh-3 3
fail-dim-lights 1 Unlic-class-drvr 1
fail-keep-right 10 Unlic-Drvr 22
flee-officer-3 4 unlic-Op 6
follow-too-close 2 unsafe-passing 3
Bombay'Court'Docket'0'Recidivism'April'1st'0'July'31st,'2014'(Charge'Tally)
Top'5'Charges
